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In this study we examine both informed trading and contraire trading preceding 
takeover announcements on US target firms. Our findings suggest that both informed 
trading and contraire trading exists within the period preceding takeover 
announcements on both the stock and option markets as evident through abnormal 
returns and trading volumes. In regard to contraire trading, this study investigates 
possible explanations for its existence including liquidity clustering, falsely informed 
trading and deliberate contraire trading. The results find that bid-ask spreads actually 
increase over the pre-announcement period indicating that liquidity clustering is an 
unlikely explanation. However, through analysis of an unbiased sample of rumoured 
target firms, deliberate contraire trading appears both a profitable and more likely 
explanation for contraire trading than falsely informed trading. 
 
 
Key terms: Informed Trading; Contraire Trading; Market Efficiency; Event Study. 
                                            
∗ Corresponding author. Email: singh@deakin.edu.au 
  1 
1.1  Introduction 
 
One of the central aims of any financial market is to provide efficiency. While many would argue that 
in a perfect world strong-form efficiency is desirable. In reality, practical limitations and market 
imperfections provide opportunities for market inefficiencies to exist. Prior research has identified 
informed trading as a possible source of market inefficiency, as evident by abnormal returns and 
abnormal trading volumes in target stocks during the period prior to takeover announcements 
(Meulbroek, 1992). However, very little research has investigated the behavioral phenomenon of 
informed trader ‘over-reaction’ to takeover rumours as an alternative source of inefficiency.  
 
The present study contends that investors may suffer behavioral biases and often overreact to inside 
information and rumours of takeovers. Thus, in addition to being able to observe evidence of informed 
trading in the pre-announcement period, it is suggested that there may concurrently be a sizeable 
amount of ‘contraire’
1 trading evident aimed at exploiting this overreaction to takeover rumours for 
earning abnormal. If found, such elements of trading would extend the perception of market 
inefficiency in the pre-announcement period to not only be consisting of the commonly cited informed 
trading, but also to the existence of additional investors taking contraire trading positions against overly 
reactive informed traders. 
 
The principal purpose of this study is to analyze market efficiency through observing trading patterns 
in takeover targets by (1) examining target stocks through abnormal returns and trading volumes and 
options through trading volumes for evidence that both informed and ‘contraire’ trading in the period 
of time prior to price sensitive takeover announcements may be occurring and (2) examining the 
profitability (hence viability) of contraire trading in the context of takeover rumours through an 
example trading strategy. Furthermore, this study also investigates the effect firm size and option 
availability has on market efficiency in the pre-announcement period. Robustness is also added to the 
study by examining the likelihood that an alternative hypothesis – that of ‘liquidity clustering’ – may 
be responsible for producing trading patterns in target stocks that resemble contraire trading.  
 
1.2  Market Efficiency and the Takeover Market: An Overview 
 In general, expansive corporate restructuring activity can take place in two forms, either through a 
‘merger’ or an ‘acquisition/takeover’. From a strict theoretical standpoint, mergers and acquisitions are 
clearly distinguishable. However, for the purposes of this study, mergers and acquisitions are 
indistinguishable, as both represent a process that transfers the corporate locus of control from the 
acquired firm to the acquiring firm (Alberti and Green, 2001). Therefore, throughout this study, the 
terms ‘merger’, ‘acquisition’ and ‘takeover’ are interchangeable as each represents a change of 
ownership over a portfolio of assets.  
                                            
1 Contraire trading can be defined as evaluating the opinion of the investing public, and when that opinion reaches 
an unreasonable extreme, investing against it (Gallea & Patalon, 1998).  
  2Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) found that corporate restructuring results in an overall improvement in 
efficiency by transferring assets to those firms which can use them more effectively. The 
aforementioned finding suggests that corporate restructuring activities produce synergies through 
allocative efficiency. As such, companies who can use assets more effectively will presumably be 
willing to offer a higher price, either a takeover premium (Jensen and Ruback, 1983) than the 
valuations of the current owner or the market. Given takeover premiums are generally significantly 
positive (Dodd, 1980; Asquith, 1983; Jensen and Ruback, 1983 and Singh and Agarwal, 2006), there is 
substantial incentive for investors to identify takeover targets and take long positions before the 
takeover announcement to benefit from the premium, thus leading to heightened trading activity.  
 
1.3  Methodology 
In this paper we are analyzing the trading patterns of takeover targets prior to the impact of takeover 
announcements for finding possible informed trading, in addition to examining the profitability of 
trading against rumoured target firms. This research adopts standard event study methodology, and is 
largely based on the foundations set by Brown & Warner (1985). Essentially the method consists of 
calculating abnormal activity (i.e. daily activity in excess of the activity expected if the event had not 
occurred) and testing whether this activity is statistically significant. Other methodologies and 
extensions such as the alternative abnormal volume calculation suggested by Deininger, Kaserer & 
Roos (2000) are added to provide robustness to the findings.  
 
Within the field of financial economics the investigation of an event is a very common theme in 
research. Numerous studies investigating takeover announcements will be discussed in the literature 
review. The suggested reason event studies have enjoyed such widespread use is due to ease of 
application, in addition to its ability to find abnormal effects in small data sets without losing any 
relative power. However, while event studies have clear strengths, it is also recognized that event 
studies have a clear limitation, this being that results may be influenced by multiple events occurring 
around the same time. Sawyer and Gygax (2001) highlight the problem of learning and convergence 
across events, suggesting subsequent events of the same type are biased by recursive residuals. Clearly 
though, such a problem is not pertinent to this study, due to takeover events not reoccurring. 
 
To the authors’ knowledge only one other study – that by Gao and Oler (2004) – has examined the 
phenomenon of contraire trading in response to market overreaction in the context of informed trading 
prior to takeover announcements. It is this lack of prior research in the area that serves as a highly 
motivating factor upon which this research is based. Gao and Oler (2004), indicates that a substantial 
time lag exists between higher than normal volume and significant upward stock price movement, 
investigated this temporal relationship, further they have suggested that this disparity occurs for a 
period of time because an increase in informed/speculative buying is offset by high net worth or 
institutional investors engaging in the profitable arbitrage of shorting against takeover rumours
2. Such 
                                            
2 In essence these ‘contraire’ traders are ‘betting’ against potentially informed traders on the basis that takeover 
rumours have a higher likelihood to not eventuate, than to eventuate.  
  3a phenomenon has important ramifications by adding to the body of knowledge on both the extent of 
market inefficiency and the extent of behavioral biases inherent in investors, while also having 
practical implications in terms of exploitative trading strategies. Thus, this hypothesis – as described on 
the stock market by Gao and Oler (2004) will be re-examined, in addition to examining the existence of 
the same phenomenon on the options market for reasons to be discussed in the literature review. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 will continue by reviewing the relevant 
theoretical frameworks that apply to this area of research. Further, it will compare and analyze how 
prior empirical results fit within these frameworks. Section 3 describes the data collection, filtration 
and methodology adopted. Section 4 presents the empirical findings of this study, whereas Section 5 
provides a more in depth discussion of how the findings compare and contrast to prior research. 
Finally, Section 6 summarizes conclusions drawn and suggests avenues for further research. 
 
Section 2: Literature Review 
 
Market inefficiencies that are not exploitable are still consistent with the concept of an efficient market 
(Jensen, 1978). Numerous studies investigating target firms and the period before takeover 
announcements have shown that, while the announcement still comes as an efficient surprise to the 
market, as indicated by significant abnormal returns on the day of the announcement, there also exists a 
degree of inefficiency as evident through significant abnormal returns in the period preceding the 
announcements. Such studies include Mandelker, 1974; Keown and Pinkerton, 1981; Asquith, 1983; 
Dennis and McConnell, 1986; Franks and Harris, 1989; Gao and Oler, 2004 and Singh and Agarwal, 
2006. Mandelker (1974) showed a 13.1% cumulative abnormal return to target firms in the 7 months 
preceding the announcement, indicating inefficiency and information asymmetry. Franks and Harris 
(1989) conducted a similar study showing a 21.3% abnormal return for firms on the day of 
announcement, however a 29.7% cumulative abnormal return over the four months leading up to and 
including the announcement day Similar results can be found in a study by Brown and da Silva Rosa 
(1998), who found a 25% cumulative abnormal return over the month preceding, and including the day 
of announcement.  
 
However, regardless of the context, a significant amount of prior research suggests that in addition to 
price, trading volume contains useful information about the trading process (Karpoff, 1987; Gallant, 
Rossi & Tauchen, 1992; Blume, Easley & O’Hara, 1994).  Keown and Pinkerton (1981) show that 
daily returns become abnormally high by day [-5] relative to the announcement day. Further, they state 
that 64% of their sample shows abnormally high volume by day [-15] relative to the announcement 
day, a significant lag of 10 trading days thereby existing between the two. However, this 10 day lag and 
the inter-relation between abnormal return and abnormal volume is not discussed; suffice to say that 
they used the abnormal volume figures in conjunction with the abnormal return figures to substantiate 
their claim that informed trading is indeed prevalent prior to takeover announcements. Singh and 
Agarwal (2006) found that abnormal returns and abnormal volume were prevalent within their 42 firm 
  4sample, with 6 firms showing obvious signs of informed trading. Subsequent studies to that of Keown 
and Pinkerton were conducted, all finding a consistent result, this being (1) a share price run-up prior to 
the announcement date coupled with (2) an abnormal volume run-up prior to the announcement date. In 
all cases the abnormal volume preceded the share price run-up, or occurred at roughly the same period 
of time (Jarrell & Poulsen, 1989; Eyssell & Arshadi, 1993; Draper & Paudyal, 1999).  
 
In addition to the stock market, Arnold, Erwin, Nail and Bos (2000) evaluate the prevalence of 
informed trading in the option market prior to a takeover announcement by comparing the trading 
patterns of call options with strike prices that should be preferred by insiders to those call options with 
strike prices which should be preferred by general speculators
3. They find that while both types of 
options contracts are frequently used, trading in the optimally informed contracts becomes a higher 
proportion of total trading during the run-up period, indicating the presence of informed trading. 
Similarly Jayaraman, Frye and Sabherwal (2001) highlight the prevalence of informed trading in the 
option market prior to a takeover announcement. Furthermore, they find that abnormal volume activity 
on the options market precedes abnormal volume on the stock market, which in turn precedes the 
abnormal price run-up; thus inferring that the option market plays an important role in price discovery.  
 
Cao, Chen and Griffin (2003) concluded that analyzing option volume activity is of more use in 
investigating informed trading prior to takeover announcements than looking at stock volume activity. 
Interestingly, follow-up research on many of the takeovers used in the majority of the aforementioned 
studies samples confirms that at least some of the pre-trade volume is without doubt driven by illegally 
informed trade (Meulbroek, 1992; Cornell and Sirri, 1992); these studies used the legal court 
documentation of SEC prosecuted investors to demonstrate many instances of illegally informed trade.  
 
As an alternative to informed trading, Jensen and Ruback (1983) proposed that much of the price-run 
up in the target firm prior to the announcement date can be as a result of legitimate ‘market 
anticipation’. Further work in the area has led to suggestions that these predictions may come about by 
investors using publicly available information such as following the pattern of takeover ‘waves’ in 
specific industries (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996). In their study of pre-announcement price run-up 
Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) controlled for the effect of media speculation and find that those firms 
which have higher media scrutiny and speculation achieve higher price-run ups than those that are not 
as highly scrutinized. As a result they claim that the price-run ups are consistent with the idea that 
legitimate market anticipation is occurring, and not trading on inside information. 
 
                                            
3 Obviously, informed traders would prefer call option contracts with a strike price out of the money, so as to 
maximize their profit once the announcement date hits, as opposed to general speculators predicting price 
movements relating to other market factors, which would be more likely to hold a conservative strike price.  
  5A further alternative explanation of the run-up in pre-announcement abnormal returns includes the run-
up reflecting the accumulating strategy of a ‘toehold’
4. Viewing the literature in its entirety, it is 
apparent that the pre-announcement run-up is likely to be a combination of both informed trading and 
legitimate market anticipation.  
 
While these studies took various positions as to the prevalence of informed trading (if at all), none of 
the papers attempted to explain the temporal relationships that are apparent in the time lag between 
their abnormal volume and return measure run-ups. Gao and Oler (2004) suggest three possible 
explanations as to why for a period of time significant increases in seller volume accompany significant 
increases in buyer volume. These being liquidity clustering, falsely informed trades, and lastly 
arbitrage.  
 
2.1  Liquidity Clustering 
 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) proposed in their study that discretionary liquidity traders
5 tend to cluster 
around stocks with higher volume, these traders doing so to trade their stocks (both buy and sell) at a 
time of higher market liquidity. However, if the liquidity clustering explanation is held true, the higher 
volume of trading preceding the price run-up should be accompanied with improved liquidity in the 
target stocks as this is the key luring factor. To examine this hypothesis, Gao and Oler (2004) examined 
the target firm bid/ask spread, and quoted depth as measures of liquidity. They found that neither 
showed evidence of improved liquidity; bid/ask spreads actually increased within the pre-
announcement period, and quoted depth remained average until the actual announcement. Thus, 
liquidity clustering was suggested to be an unlikely explanation for the lag effect between abnormal 
volume and returns in the pre-announcement period. 
 
2.2  Falsely Informed Trades 
 
Cornell and Sirri (1992) describe falsely informed traders as those who fail to recognize that informed 
trading is occurring in regard to a given security, or alternatively who incorrectly believe they have 
superior information than those informed traders. These investors equate very closely to the noise 
traders discussed in Black (1986), where noise trading is defined as those trades on irrelevant or 
incorrect information. As a result these traders after consulting their valuation models may believe the 
target is overpriced and sell, offsetting the effect of informed/speculative buy-side investors. Thus, 
falsely informed traders should lose money on these transactions, as distinct from those traders that are 
deliberately selling as a result of ascertaining that informed trading is incorrectly occurring, in effect 
conducting arbitrage. 
                                            
4 A toehold is said to be a pre-emptive accumulation of stock over time with a view to other activities, hence it is 
investors observing this process and the prediction of further activities that leads to increased buying and 
subsequent price run-up (Gomes, 2000). 
5 Discretionary liquidity traders are those traders that are able to strategically choose when to trade to minimize 
their transaction costs (low bid/ask spreads) during periods of “thick” market activity, or high volume (Admati and 
Pfleiderer, 1988). 
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2.3  Arbitrage 
 
Harris and Raviv (1993) found that there is a cognitive disparity underlying trading that result in 
traders differing in the way they interpret that information. This heterogeneity of beliefs amongst 
investors leads to higher than normal trading volume; whereas the movement of the actual price 
remains steady. To examine whether there are in fact traders deliberately selling, even though they are 
aware there is potentially informed trading occurring; Gao and Oler (2004) undertook an unbiased 
study investigating takeover rumours sourced from the Wall Street Journal in a similar method to a 
study first conducted by Pound and Zeckhauser (1990)
6. Gao and Oler (2004) found that a trading 
strategy of shorting all takeover rumours that appear in the Wall Street Journal is profitable, with an 
abnormal return relative to investing in the S&P500 Index of 4.8% over a 70 day period. The trading 
strategy is profitable because while in those rumours where the takeover actually eventuates the seller 
suffers large losses, in 81% of cases the rumours are an over-reaction and do not eventuate leading to 
an exploitation of over-pricing
7. Ziveney, Bertin & Torabzadeh (1996) conduct a similar study and find 
that on average the market over-reacts with an excess return of 20 per cent achieved by shorting 
takeover rumours from day 0 to 100; thus they conclude that the explanation of arbitrage traders 
profitably selling against takeover rumours is the most likely reason for the lag between abnormal 
volume and return run-ups in the pre-announcement period.  
 
As alluded to above, such arbitrage selling is suggested to occur because of the exploitation of the 
behavioral over-reaction of certain investors to relevant information. Daniel, Hirshleifer and 
Subrahmanyam (1998) suggest such an effect is primarily caused by the two psychological regularities 
of overconfidence and attribution bias
8.  
 
2.4  The Option Market 
 
Black (1975) suggested that informed traders may prefer to trade on the options market because of the 
advantages of using leverage to increase their profiteering on risk-less information. Jayaraman, Frye 
and Sabherwal (2001) show a roughly proportionate increase in put and call volume prior to takeover 
announcements. The increased call volume would most likely be informed traders looking to profit 
from the price run-up. However, a question arises as to why there is an increased put option volume. 
Could this be an evidence of arbitragers trading against takeover rumours in target firms on the options 
market, or merely partially informed or speculative traders hedging their position with a straddle 
strategy? 
                                            
6 The reason the study is ‘unbiased’ is due to the fact that a pool of takeover rumours is used which contains 
rumours that may or may not eventuate. At the time of publishing within the Wall Street Journal it is unknown as 
to whether each rumour will or will not eventuate into an actual takeover event. 
7 Griffin and Tversky (1992) propose that in general investors overreact to rumours because they focus on the 
strength or extremeness of the available evidence with insufficient regard for its weight or credence, this 
explanation is perpetuated during periods of high merger and acquisition activity. 
8 Overconfidence refers to investors placing too great a weight on their own ability to generate private information 
for trading. Attribution bias refers to investors updating the confidence in their own ability in a biased manner. For 
more detailed explanations see Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998). 
  7 
There is a wealth of previous empirical investigations comparing the informational content of the 
options market relative to the stock market (Patell and Wolfson, 1981; Manaster and Rendleman, 1982; 
Bhattacharaya, 1987; Anthony, 1988; Stephan and Whaley, 1990; Chan, Chung, and Johnson, 1993; 
and Sheikh and Ronn, 1994). Of particular interest is work done by Pan and Poteshman (2003) 
investigating open put and call volumes. They found that public investors generally trade in the option 
market as contrarians – buying puts on stocks that have done well and calls on stocks that have done 
poorly, but they were unable to determine whether the trading was as a result of insider trading, or 
traders legitimately trading on superior information sets.  
 
Given that the evidence suggesting informed and contrarian trading appears more prevalent on the 
option market than the stock market, and considering the many studies which highlight that option 
market trading precedes stock market trading, the option market appears an interesting area in which to 
extend the analysis of pre-announcement trading in takeover targets. Furthermore, an option analysis 




Section 3: Data and Methodology 
 
3.1  Data 
 
Our initial dataset comprises the complete set of U.S. takeover announcements on public firms made 
from January 1, 2001 to June 30, 2006. The contents of each announcement and the trading data for the 
target firms were obtained from the Bloomberg database, with the firms either listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the American Stock Exchange (AMEX). Out of the initial dataset, we 
selected firms that met the following criteria: 
1.  The firms must be common stocks, we excluded all closed-end funds, American Depository 
Receipts and Real-Estate Investment Trusts 
2.  The firm must have sufficient trading data 
3.  The announcement is the primary offer 
4.  The acquisition must actually occur 
5.  The firm must not be in financial distress
10  
 
The initial sample consisted of 890 firms, however after the filters were applied the useable sample was 
reduced to 393 firms, majority of companies filtered were in the announcement deal range $100M-
500M
11. In fact, for targets involved in deals less than $100M there is almost no data available at all. 
Unfortunately, the lack of data on deals of size less than 100M made them impractical to be studied. 
                                            
9 Burghardt (2005) stated that derivative use has grown from 188 million contracts in 1984 to 8.9 billion contracts 
in 2004, representing an annual growth rate of approximately 21% over the 20 year period. 
10 This was subjectively evaluated by simply looking for substantially plunging share prices to very low values in 
the year prior to the announcement.  
11 The firm size groupings of $100M-500M and $500M plus were chosen as they disseminated the sample into 
larger and smaller firms while maintaining a fairly even sample size upon which to conduct the analysis.  
  8However, the proportion of firms that would have been filtered out due to financial distress in the sub 
100M category would have been increasing at an increasing rate as the deal size decreased, the fact of 
which may reduce the limitation of their omission.  
 
Upon filtration, the dataset is then dichotomized into differing groups for analysis; one such group is 
those target firms which have options available on the underlying stock to trade, and those that do not. 
Such a separation will make it possible to observe any migration effect whereby contraire trading 
moves from existing on the underlying stock to the option contracts. The final sample dataset has the 
following descriptive statistics across years as shown in Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics of Target Companies 








No. of targets 
with sufficient** 
option trading 
volume data for 
detailed analysis 
Year Mean  Median  Tender  Stock  Other^     
2001 2163.33  629.84  34  28  13  34  17 
2002 1817.64  289.95  28  15  4  10  4 
2003 1032.05  437.44  31  12  9  14  6 
2004 2365.83  663.84  48  18  16  21  7 
2005 3321.69  667.98  62  21  25  39  22 
2006* 1860.26 902.65  22  2  5  4  3 
Total 2284.87  571.38  225  96  72  122  59 
*The year 2006 includes only up to June 30
th. 
**A firm which has multiple zero volume trading days in a row is deemed to have insufficient data. 
^Other being defined as a combination of cash and stock, or debt. 
 
Similar to Gao and Oler (2004), a secondary data set is also used in determining the second component 
of this study, this being investigating the profitability or viability of contraire trading by obtaining all 
firms that are rumoured takeover targets within the Wall Street Journal
12 over the same time period. 
This was obtained by using the Factiva database for all firms rumoured to be targets published in the 
Wall Street Journal from January 1, 2001, to June 30, 2006. A secondary sample was obtained 





                                            
12  Other prominent publications such as the New York Times and USA Today were examined for takeover 
rumours. However, neither publication was found to actually publish rumours of takeovers on a regular basis. 
  9Table 3.2: Secondary “Rumoured” Target Firm Sample 
Year 
No. of Initial Rumoured  
Takeover Targets 
No. of Rumoured Targets With  
Sufficient Trading Data Available 
2001 10  7 
2002 4  3 
2003 5  4 
2004 4  4 
2005 11  11 
2006* 3  3 
Total 37  32^ 
*The year 2006 includes only up to June 30
th. 
^Of the 32 rumoured firms found, 6  (18.7%) ended up in actual takeover events. 
 
3.2  Hypotheses 
 
The initial hypothesis constructed regarding trading on target stocks in its initial form consists of the 
following test. 
 
H0: The takeover announcement has no impact on the underlying stock/option price and/or trading 
volume. 
H1: The takeover announcement has either a positive or negative impact on the underlying stock/option 
price and/or trading volume. 
 
Given the large proportion of studies outlined in the literature review finding positively abnormal 
returns and trading volumes in target firms before takeover announcements, it is expected this study 
will also find positive abnormal activity. A change in the underlying price and volume of securities will 
only be shown if demonstrated to be statistically significant using two-tailed tests. 
 
However, as previously specified, of more interest to this study is the temporal relationship between 
abnormal returns and trading volumes, in particular the existence of market inefficiency through 
contraire trading counteracting informed trading.  
 
H0: There exists no lag effect between abnormal trading volume and abnormal returns prior to the 
takeover announcement. 
H1: There exists a lag effect between abnormal trading volume and abnormal returns prior to takeover 
announcements, and contraire trading is a likely explanation for such a lag effect. 
 
3.3  Methodology 
 
The first part of the study involves investigating the prevalence of informed trading through the 
existence of abnormal returns and volume in the pre-announcement period. The second part of the 
  10study involves investigating whether any lag effect between abnormal volume run-ups and abnormal 
return run-ups is consistently evident in target firms by firstly examining the underlying stocks, and 
secondly examining the options of those stocks if available. Such a lag effect existing in the data set 
between abnormal volume and return run-ups would support the prevalence of contraire traders 
deliberately trading against an overreaction by informed traders, as evident by abnormal selling 
occurring for a period of time roughly matching that of abnormal buying. To examine whether this 
selling may in fact be deliberate arbitrage trading, the alternative liquidity clustering hypothesis and the 
falsely informed trading hypothesis are examined.  
 
3.3.1  Abnormal Returns 
 
Standard event-study procedures are to be used to calculate the abnormal pre-announcement returns for 
targets over a period of 80 days prior to the announcement to one day after announcement (See Keown 
and Pinkerton, 1981 and Brown and Warner, 1985).  The abnormal return in any given period is 
estimated by the market model residual, which is the difference between the stocks actual continuously 
compounded realized return (log form) and the predicted return based on the market model for that 
period
13.  To determine the individual stock price parameters in the estimation model, an estimation 
period of 200 days is used, ending 50 days before the event date.  
The market adjusted abnormal returns are thus calculated as follows: 
 
(1)     ( ) it it it R E R AR − =  
 
Where 
  ARit is the abnormal return for firm i on day t; 
  Rit is the actual (log form) return for firm i on day t; and 
E(Rit) is the expected return (market model) of the stock based on 200-day computed 
parameters for each firm i. 
 
The ordinary least squares (OLS) model, in which returns on a given security i are regressed against the 
concurrent returns of the market, is used to estimate the normal or expected stock returns. Once the 
estimates of the market model parameters are obtained they are then used to calculate the expected 
returns for the relevant event period of day -80 through to one day past the announcement date
14: 
 
(2)     ( ) it mt i i it R R E μ β α + + = ) (   for t = 1, 2, …, T 
 
                                            
13 Importantly, the market model is chosen over comparative methods – such as the mean reversion model – for its 
power to remove systematic market effects that may induce abnormal returns incorrectly. Studies by Dyckman, 
Philbrick & Stephen (1984) and Cable & Holland (1999) have highlighted the market model as a simple, powerful 
and accurate method by which to calculate abnormal activity. 
14 It is recognized there is an overlap between the event window [-80, 1] and the estimation period  
[-250,-50]. However, the overlap of 30 days is not expected to bias the study. 
  11Where 
  Rit is the return on security i for period t; 
  RMt is the return on market index, S&P500, for period t; 
  αi is the intercept term; βi is the slope coefficient; 
μit is the standard error term; and  T is the number of periods in the estimation period. 
 
The announcement date (day 0) is given as the announcement publication date obtained from the 
Bloomberg database
15. Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the time period extending eighty days 
before the announcement date are calculated as: 
 
(3)       ∑ = it it AR CAR
 
Average cumulative abnormal returns (ACAR) for the N or companies are calculated as: 












If average cumulative abnormal returns are statistically different from zero, we conclude that informed 
trading has likely caused abnormal returns during the pre-announcement period.  
 
  This study assessed serial correlation (through the Breusch-Godfrey LM test), heteroskedasticity 
(through White’s test for detecting heteroskedasticity), and non-stationarity (through the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test). The vast majority of tests indicated the market model did not suffer problems that 
lead to spurious results. However, in the case of 36 companies, the estimate of beta was found to be 
insignificant at the 5% level. While in most instances insignificant betas are clearly undesirable 
indicating a non-existent relationship between variables, it is a fairly low proportion given the sample 
size (393 firms), and thus may not be detrimental to this study.  
  
Table 3.3: Summary of Econometric Diagnostic Testing on Market Model         N=393 
Problem Type 
No. of targets suffering 
econometric problem 
% of total sample suffering 
econometric problem 
Heteroskedasticity 39  9.92% 
Serial Correlation  56  14.25% 
Non-Stationarity 0  0.00% 
Insignificant β co-efficient*  36  9.16% 
*Insignificant at the 5% level. 
 
                                            
15 For a small random sample of 30 firms the Bloomberg announcement date was cross checked against the media 
publication dates using the Factiva . In all cases the announcement date specified by Bloomberg was correct. 
  12To determine statistical significance, a standard cross-sectional test statistic is used as prescribed by 
Brown & Warner (1985). Firstly, each abnormal (or cumulative abnormal) return ARit (CARit) in the 
event period is divided by its estimation period standard deviation to yield standardized abnormal 
returns AR`it  
 








AR =  
 
Where: 
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Consequently the test statistic for any given day is given by: 



















  AR’it is the standardized abnormal return i for period t; and 
  Nt is the number of sample securities for period t. 
 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CARit) for any given day required one further adjustment in regard to 
their test statistic. This being where each cumulative abnormal return is divided by the square root of 





























                                            
16 The adjustment for the cumulative abnormal return test statistic is used as prescribed by Strong (1992). 
  13If the standardized abnormal returns are independent, and identically distributed with finite variance – 
as they should be extremely close to following the standardization procedure – the test statistic will be 
distributed unit normal for large Nt (Brown & Warner, 1985)
17. 
 
3.3.2  Abnormal Trading Volume 
 
Measuring abnormal trading volume requires a benchmark for expected trading volume.  Firstly, 
volume is controlled for firm-specific (time series) factors and secondly (cross-sectional) market 
factors that are unrelated to the announcement. The cross sectional abnormal volume is thus computed 
as follows: 
 
(10)    
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 V t,target  =  number of firm i's shares traded on day t; 
 V normal,target = mean of firm i's shares traded over control period [-250,-51]; 
 V t,market   = number of S&P500 shares traded on day t, and 
 V normal,market = mean of S&P500 shares traded over control period [-250,-51]. 
 
Average abnormal volume for N firms is then calculated for cross-sectional analysis across firms: 












To determine if the level of trading volume activity is abnormal before the day of the announcement, 
the same eighty-day period before the announcement is examined. In general – volume is a highly 
volatile factor, often with large variances, non-normal distributions and many outliers, which is 
particularly evident in our data-set. To overcome these problematic characteristics, a seminal study by 
Ajinka & Jain (1989) into trading volume found that using a logarithmic transformation of the volume 
variable lead to an approximately normal distribution with the influence of outliers greatly reduced. In 
addition, further studies of abnormal volume such as that by Deininger, Kaserer & Roos (2000) have 
noted that the amount of freely floating shares influences the volume of shares traded over time. As a 
result, this study adopts an additional, logarithmic, ratio measure of abnormal volume – similar to that 
used by Deininger, Kaserer & Roos (2000) – which incorporates the influence of shares outstanding for 
comparison with discrete measure described earlier by Gao & Oler (2004), is as follows:  
                                            
17 If the abnormal returns are not normally distributed, independent and with constant variance then parametric 
testing is spurious, and in such a case a non-parametric test such as the sign-rank test of Wilcoxon should be used. 
However, due to the large sample size this is considered unlikely. 
















ln '  
Where 
 V it   = number shares traded on day t in firm i, and 
  FFSit = number of free floating stocks on day t in firm i
18. 
 
Note that one is added in the numerator in order to prevent the variable from becoming indeterminate. 
Once volume is normalized, abnormal volume is then calculated after controlling for cross-sectional 
market factors by: 
 
(13)     [] [ ] m mt i it it V V V V AV − − − = '    
Where 
  Vit  = normalized number of shares traded on day t in firm i,  
  i V   = normalized mean of number of shares traded in firm i, 
 V mt  = logarithm of volume traded on S&P500 on day t, and 
  m V   = logarithmic mean of volume traded on S&P500 in estimation period.  
 
Finally, a cross-sectional average abnormal volume across N firms is calculated: 
  













As per the abnormal return methodology, abnormal volume calculations are tested for statistical 
significance using the standard Brown & Warner (1985) methodology as previously described.  
 
Options: 
Arnold, Erwin, Nail & Bos (2000), show that option volume has little correlation with measures of 
market volume and thus the simplistic mean reversion model that ignores the influence of systematic 
events is sufficient. However, due to the extreme volatility of option trading volume, the variable is 
transformed into its logarithmic form as per volume traded on the spot market to provide a normalized 
variable. Thus aggregate abnormal put and call option volumes are calculated as follows: 
 
(15)     [ ] ) ln( ) ln( i it it CV E CV ACV − =  
(16)     [ ] ) ln( ) ln( i it it PV E PV APV − =  
                                            
18 While there are varying definitions of firms free floating stocks, this study uses the definition of its data source, 
Bloomberg, which defines free floating stocks as the number of shares outstanding, excluding treasury shares. 
Bloomberg obtains such data from annual, semi-annual, and quarterly reports, Edgar filings, press releases, and 
stock exchanges. 
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As per the abnormal return and volume methodologies, the estimation period remains consistent. If the 
suggested reasoning behind the lag effect observed between abnormal return run-ups and abnormal 
volume run-ups is also prevalent on the option market – as is hypothesized – then it can be expected to 
observe abnormal call option volume being matched for a period of time by abnormal put volume. 
Such an observation would lend weight to the probability of ‘contraire’ trading taking place, with 
traders taking a position against the likelihood of a takeover occurring and exploiting market 
inefficiency. 
 
3.3.3  Liquidity Clustering 
 
To investigate the explanation of liquidity clustering, abnormal bid-ask spread is calculated.  Four 
measures of spread are used to add robustness to the results, these being dollar spread, proportional 
spread, effective spread and proportional effective spread
19. Dollar spread is defined as the difference 
between the ask and bid prices. Proportional spread is dollar spread divided by the bid-ask midpoint. 
Effective spread is two times the absolute value of the difference between transaction price and bid-ask 
midpoint
20. Finally, proportional effective spread is scaled by the transaction price. As per many 
estimations in this study, the abnormal spread is constructed by subtracting the actual event window 
spread (-80, 1) from the average estimation period spread (-250, -51) per day in the event window. 
Finally a formal test of liquidity clustering is conducted to add further robustness to the results by 
regressing abnormal volume on abnormal spread for the entire sample during the pre-announcement 
event window. If liquidity clustering were a valid hypothesis then we would expect to see a negative 
correlation between abnormal volume and abnormal spread.  
 
3.3.4  Example Contraire Trading Strategy 
 
The other two explanations put forward as to why there is significantly increased selling prior to 
takeover announcements are uninformed trading and arbitrage. To discern between them, an analysis is 
conducted testing the profitability of ‘contraire’ trading against takeover rumours. However a problem 
arises in doing so. That is, the original dataset consists of only target firms for which a takeover 
succeeds. Therefore, the first dataset has a peek-ahead bias that renders it inappropriate for 
investigating contraire trading profitability through a strategy of shorting (or buying puts) of all firms 
which are rumoured to be targets (not just the ones where the rumours turn out to be true). 
Accordingly, the second ‘unbiased’ dataset is used that consists of all firms that are rumoured to be 
                                            
19 Conrad and Niden (1992) utilized the same four different measures of bid-ask spread. Gao and Oler (2004) only 
used dollar and proportional spread. 
20 Effective spread is ‘two times’ the absolute value of the difference between transaction price and bid-ask 
midpoint to maintain consistency with the dollar spread measure. This being because the midpoint is used rather 
than the full spread between bid and ask rates.  
  16targets published in the Wall Street Journal from January 1, 2001, to June 30, 2006
21. After screening 
these articles a trading strategy is undertaken of shorting (and/or buying the closest out of the money 
put) to simulate the likely contraire trading strategy for a period of 70 days beginning at the rumor 
publication date. The profitability of this strategy is examined by also simultaneously taking the long 
position in the S&P500 Index to test for abnormal returns.  
 
Section 4: Results 
 
4.1  Return and Volume Comparison 
 
Chart 4.1 shows that the cumulative abnormal return is consistently positive as early as day -60. 
However, the trend stagnates and does not begin to increase again until day -30, after which it 
consistently increases up to a value of 6.86% on the day before the announcement. On the day of the 
announcement, a significant abnormal return of 13.05% is observed, yielding a cumulative abnormal 
return of 19.90% over the pre-announcement period which is consistent with most previous literature
22. 
Such a high abnormal return on the day of announcement implies the announcement came as a surprise 
to the market. Thus, the 6.86% cumulative abnormal return achieved beforehand is very likely to be the 
result of informed trading. The day after the announcement yields a further abnormal return of 1.66% 
suggesting the market does not incorporate the entirety of  the announcement news into the share price 
immediately and is therefore only semi-strong efficient. 
 













                                            
21 While other rumor studies such as Clarkson, Joyce & Tutticci (2006) use internet discussion forums such as as 
their medium for obtaining rumours, discussion forums have questionable limitations as to the extent of 
penetration into market by participants. 
22 Such seminal informed trading studies include those by Keown & Pinkerton (1981) and Jarrell & Poulsen 
(1989) who report around a 20% CAR over the pre-announcement period. 
  17Chart 4.2 shows the abnormal trading volume over the same period, the volatility of which compared to 
abnormal returns is clearly evident
23. While slightly positive, abnormal volume tends to hover around 
zero up until day -50, after which it becomes consistently positive around the 10% mark to day -15. 
Following day -15, it begins to trend upwards again to an enormous 28 fold trading volume on the day 
of announcement. Trading volume remains significantly high on the day after the announcement, again 
highlighting the case for semi-strong efficiency due to a delay in the market fully disseminating the 
announcement into the stock price.  
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The relationship between both abnormal returns and volumes is shown in Table 4.1. Upon examination, 
regardless of the methodology used, abnormal volume becomes consistently statistically significant 
(1% level) at around day -14 up to the announcement. Conversely, abnormal returns do not become 
significant until day -4 (a 10 day lag). This result is fairly consistent with that found by Gao & Oler 
(2004) who found a 7 day lag. Such a result in our sample indicates that, for a period of 10 days from 
day -14 to day -4, significant buy side transactions (i.e. informed and legitimate market anticipation) 
are being offset by significant sell side activity (i.e. falsely informed trading or deliberate contraire 
trading) resulting in the share price remaining relatively steady, while the trading volume experiences a 








                                            
23 Other than magnitude there appears little difference between the discrete abnormal volume measure and the 
logarithmic free floating share adjusted method. 
  18Table 4.1: Abnormal Return and Volume Comparison – Entire Sample 
Panel A shows the AR and CAR as calculated by the market model. Panel B shows the discrete and logarithmic free floating share adjusted (FFS) abnormal trading 
volumes. Test statistics and respective significance are shown for all measures with * denoting significance at 10% level,  ** at 5% and *** at 1% levels. 
  Panel A: Abnormal Returns     
Panel B: 
Abnormal 


























t-score FFS Log Abnormal 
Volume 
-25  393  0.17%  1.01  2.03%  1.80*    17.94%  4.06***  13.58%  3.60*** 
-24  393  0.53%  4.83***  2.56%  2.43**    23.36%  4.12***  10.54%  2.56*** 
-23  393  -0.20%  -1.77*  2.36%  2.18**    34.48%  5.35***  16.94%  3.63*** 
-22  393  0.01%  -1.23  2.37%  1.99**    7.51%  2.12**  7.07%  1.24 
-21  393  0.18%  1.73*  2.55%  2.20**    8.86%  2.40**  1.03%  0.61 
-20  393  0.16%  0.96  2.71%  2.31**    3.63%  1.35  8.54%  1.80* 
-19  393  0.08%  0.57  2.79%  2.36**    10.28%  2.69***  7.83%  2.12** 
-18  393  0.25%  1.82*  3.04%  2.57**    8.94%  3.08***  10.39%  2.32** 
-17  393  0.11%  0.21  3.15%  2.58**    1.07%  0.91  9.16%  1.90* 
-16  393  0.15%  1.19  3.30%  2.71***    14.76%  2.27**  7.75%  1.70* 
-15  393  0.15%  -0.23  3.45%  2.66***    5.05%  1.38  6.53%  1.56 
-14  393  0.18%  1.09  3.63%  2.77***    20.08%  3.98***  13.35%  2.98*** 
-13  393  0.02%  0.41  3.65%  2.80***    10.38%  2.40**  8.02%  1.66* 
-12  393  0.17%  1.36  3.83%  2.94***    14.19%  2.38**  12.64%  2.46** 
-11  393  0.07%  0.14  3.90%  2.94***    32.44%  6.16***  18.01%  3.42*** 
-10  393  0.15%  0.31  4.06%  2.96***    32.44%  7.27***  16.00%  3.35*** 
-9  393  0.10%  -0.08  4.16%  2.93***    25.29%  5.31***  18.68%  4.25*** 
-8  393  -0.06%  -0.11  4.10%  2.89***    31.50%  6.80***  22.24%  5.23*** 
-7  393  0.22%  1.21  4.32%  3.01***    32.35%  7.87***  22.82%  5.54*** 
-6  393  0.19%  1.76*  4.51%  3.20***    27.38%  5.79***  16.74%  3.80*** 
-5  393  0.14%  1.45  4.65%  3.34***    58.52%  10.04***  19.15%  4.54*** 
-4  393  0.33%  2.63***  4.98%  3.62***    45.56%  10.33***  16.34%  4.48*** 
-3  393  0.33%  1.89*  5.31%  3.82***    40.90%  8.80***  17.99%  4.64*** 
-2  393  0.56%  2.69***  5.87%  4.10***    74.73%  13.06***  29.37%  7.55*** 
-1  393  0.99%  7.19***  6.86%  4.88***    105.15%  25.50***  38.40%  11.14*** 
0  393  13.05%  96.74***  19.90%  15.66***    2821.35%  553.47***  322.24%  87.82*** 
1  393  1.66%  13.15***  21.56%  17.03***    935.60%  187.05***  228.56%  61.08*** 
  19 4.2  Deal Size Effect 
 
Comparing the results of the larger to the smaller deal size sample
24, it is evident that a higher level of efficiency is prevalent in 
the larger deal size targets
25. Larger firms show a lower cumulative abnormal return on the day before the announcement with a 
5.86% cumulative abnormal return compared to 8.03% for relatively smaller targets.  In regard to abnormal trading volume, 
larger targets show positive abnormal trading volume substantially later
26 (day -50 compared to day -80) and up to a lesser 
extent than smaller targets. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that larger firms are more efficient by suggesting that 
informed trading is more prevalent on those targets of smaller size. However, in considering the issue of principle concern – that 
of any lag effect and thus evidence of contraire trading – the results are mixed. While both exhibit a lag effect to some degree – 
and thus likely contraire trading – the larger deal size exhibits a longer lag effect. The larger deal size shows a lag effect of 14 
days; as evident by abnormal volume consistently significant by day -15 (5% level), whereas its abnormal returns are significant 
at day -1 (1% level) relative to the announcement date
27.  
4.3  Option Availability Effect 
To empirically investigate whether informed and contraire trading may move across to the options on the underlying stocks, the 
sample is again segregated as previously conducted with deal size
28. As was expected, targets with options available on the 
underlying stock displayed much less evidence of informed trading compared to those targets without options available
29. Those 
targets with options available only began to show a trend of positive cumulative abnormal returns at day -32, whereas those 
targets without options available showed a positive trend as early as day -60. Further, the targets with options available reached 
a total lower CAR on the day prior to the announcement of 4.89%, compared to those without option availability giving a CAR 
of 7.76% on the day before announcement.  
 
Regardless of option availability, both samples show consistently significant abnormal returns from day -4, in addition to 
consistently significant abnormal volume at day -11. Thus, both samples report a lag effect of 7 days. However, the target firms 
with options available on the underlying stock reported many more significantly abnormal trading volume days prior to day -11 
and hence suggested greater likelihood of contraire trading. This result is perplexing as it would appear that while the informed 
traders have moved to the option market judging by the lower CAR, the lag effect suggests the contraire traders have not. One 
explanation for this may be that many of the informed traders have not moved, they have remained on the spot market, however 
the contraire trading prevalence is strong enough to severely limit any CAR over the pre-announcement period.  
                                            
24 By separating the sample into only those takeover announcements in the range of $500m USD and above, a sample size of 212 firms is 
obtained out of the total sample of 393 firms.  
25 The results of the deal size sensitivity analysis can be viewed graphically in the appendix by viewing Charts 4.3 to 4.6 and in more detail 
within Tables 4.2 and 4.3. 
26 Though, in terms of statistical significance, it is the larger deal sizes which exhibit a much higher level of statistically significant trading 
volume earlier (day -25) as compared to smaller targets (day  -10). It is suggested this is the case because smaller firms are less frequently 
traded and thus naturally have higher volatility in their trading volume.   
27 Depending on interpretation abnormal volume could be considered consistently significant as early as day –25 producing an even bigger lag 
effect of 24 days in the larger targets. 
28 By separating the sample into only those takeover announcements with options available on the underlying stock, a sample size of 122 firms 
is obtained out of the total sample of 393 firms. Consequently, the sample without options available on the underlying stock constitutes the 
remaining 271 firms. 
29 The results of the option availability sensitivity analysis can be viewed graphically in the appendix by viewing Charts 4.7 to 4.10 and in 
more detail within Tables 4.4 and 4.5. 
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4.4  Option Trading Volume 
 If informed trading had migrated to and were prevalent on the option market then we would expect to observe an increasing 
aggregate abnormal call option volume prior to the announcement. Likewise, if contraire trading had migrated to the option 
market we would expect to see an increasing aggregate abnormal put option volume before the announcement. If matching 
abnormal aggregate call and put volumes were observed it would replicate the mechanics of the lag effect between abnormal 
trading volume and abnormal returns on the underlying stock.  
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Chart 4.3 displays a direct comparison between aggregate abnormal call and put option volume. Surprisingly, both abnormal call 
and put option volume are consistently positive as far back as day -55 relative to the announcement. Further, both abnormal call 
and put option volumes display a positive trend that increases to the day before the announcement, at which point they spike 
upwards to highs of 52% and 50.69% respectively on the day of announcement. Both results support the hypothesis that 
informed trading and contraire trading migrate to the option market. Lending further weight to this hypothesis is that abnormal 
put option volume roughly mimics the movement of abnormal call option volume throughout the pre-announcement period. 
While the result is not conclusive, it indicates that to at least some extent both informed trading and contraire trading occur on 
the option market as well as the spot market, with the informed trading result consistent with that found by Jayaraman, Frye and 
Sabherwal (2001). 
 
4.5  Liquidity Clustering 
If liquidity clustering is a likely reason behind the increased selling, shortening bid-ask spreads (negative abnormal spreads) 
should be observed in the pre-announcement period. Within the appendix, Table 4.6 displays the abnormal spread for all 4 
  - 21 -methods of calculation in the period (-25, 1). Consistent with findings by Conrad and Niden (1992), it shows that regardless of 
the method used to calculate abnormal spread, the majority of spreads over the pre-announcement period are overwhelmingly 
positive, indicating that transaction costs actually increase over this period. Furthermore, Table 4.7 displays a formal regression 
test over the pre-announcement period of abnormal volume on the abnormal spreads. Again, all coefficients indicate a 
significant positive relationship between abnormal volume and abnormal spread. This finding is inconsistent with the liquidity 
clustering hypothesis, suggesting it is an unlikely explanation for the increased selling in the pre-announcement period. 
 
 
Table 4.7:  Regression of Abnormal Volume on Abnormal Spread Using White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors 
and Covariance*. 
Spre Effective Spread 
 
  Dollar Spread  Proportional 
ad  Effective Spread  Proportional 





0.00000  0.01200  0.00000 
Coeffecient (β)  0.37513 22.54927 0.45605 43.28832 
p-value  0.00490 0.01490 0.00000 0.00000 
Adj-R²  0.24472 0.16458 0.47507 0.45193 
*Hete ticity was fo dent in th sions thus W teroskasticit nt Standard Errors and 
Cova ustment was to adjust the rrors for rel
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4.6  Example Contraire Trading Strategy 
T
rumoured target on the rumour publication date a
excess of the market. The strategy is expected to be profitable because – on average – more rumours are expected to be false 
than true in the long run. Thus while contraire traders will lose money on those rumours that do turn into actual takeovers, they 
will obtain a higher return from the larger majority of rumours which do not. 
 
As expected the strategy returns a 7.18% profit in excess of the S&P500 ind
p
of January 1
st 1990 to December 31
st 2001. As can be seen in Chart 4.4 over the period    [-10, 0] prior to the rumour publication 
in the WSJ, a 13% return is achieved indicating a likely leakage of information (i.e. insider trading) as the rumour disseminates 
into the market. Importantly, this return run-up is the markets perceived value on the probability that the rumours are true. 
However, over the subsequent 70 days, the return (on average) drifts downward as most of the rumours are found out to be false 
speculation. In this sample only 6 of the 32 (18.75%) of rumoured target firms actually eventuated into takeover events within 
the 70 days examined. The market has over-reacted to the probability that the rumours were true.  














In comparison, Chart 4.5 shows the cumulative returns of those 6 firms that did actually turn into takeover events. As can be 
seen on the rumour publication date an 11.98% return is achieved over the period [-10, 0] as the rumour is disseminated into the 
market. Continuing on over the period [0, 70] each of the rumours are found to be true and further returns are added to a final 
return of 29.49%. Contraire trading in these targets would clearly yield significantly negative returns.  
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5.1  Informed Trading 
Overall, evidence supporting the prevalence of informed trading was found in this study with significantly positive cumulative 
abnormal returns and trading volumes evident in the pre-announcement period. This finding is consistent with earlier US 
research into the prevalence of informed trading in takeover target firms such as that by Keown and Pinkerton (1981) and 
Draper and Paudyal (1999). Further our findings are also consistent with other geographical regions; Franks and Harris (1989) 
finding similar results in the United Kingdom, Brown and Da Silva Rosa (1998) in the Australian market and Singh and 
Agarwal (2006) in Indian market. Furthermore, consistent with the studies of Easley, O’Hara and Srinivas, (1998), significantly 
positive abnormal call option volumes were observed in the pre-announcement period, indicating informed trading appeared to 
be occurring on the option market also.  
 
In totality, the findings clearly suggest the market is semi-strong efficient. On the one hand the argument for inefficiency is 
supported by cumulative abnormal returns and trading volume in the pre-announcement period that alludes to information 
asymmetry. Conversely, on the other hand, a large degree of efficiency is supported by the fact that this study and similar 
studies show that the actual takeover announcement still comes as a large surprise to the market; the surprise being evident 
given the substantial abnormal return and trading volume still occurring on the actual day and day after the announcement. 
Thus, while inefficiency appears to exist through private information being exploited in the pre-announcement period, the 
majority of investors are still surprised by the announcement and subsequently this public information of the takeover is 
efficiently impounded into the price.  
 
Strong form efficiency suggests that information is instantaneously impounded into prices, however this study – and all except 
the Franks and Harris (1989) study – found that there were still significant abnormal returns and trading volumes for a period of 
time following the announcement. While it is hard to determine (and beyond the scope of this study) the extent of whether such 
abnormal trading is the result of illegally informed trading, or legitimate market anticipation as suggested by Jensen and Ruback 
(1983).  
 
5.2  Contraire Trading 
This study found that during the pre-announcement period, trading volume was significantly abnormal well before returns were 
abnormal. This suggests that for an extended period of time, the amount of buying was being offset by selling. Such a result is 
consistent with the findings of Keown and Pinkerton, 1981; Jarrell & Poulsen, 1989; Eyssell & Arshadi, 1993; Draper & 
Paudyal, 1999; and Gao and Oler, 2004. Of further interest, it was found on the option market that significantly positive 
abnormal put option volume was mimicking the movements of significantly positive abnormal call option volume. This 
suggesting that, as per the underlying stock market, contraire trading appears to be occurring on the option market also. Why 
then is this selling occurring within the pre-announcement period always at a seeming loss? 
 
One explanation suggested by Gao and Oler (2004) was a liquidity clustering hypothesis. This study however, found that within 
the pre-announcement period, bid-ask spreads actually increased. Furthermore, there was actually a positive relationship 
  - 24 -between abnormal volume and abnormal spreads, indicating that as trading volume increased so did the spread. This result was 
robust for four different measures of spread and was consistent with the findings of Gao and Oler (2004) and Conrad and Niden 
(1992), suggesting that the liquidity clustering hypothesis is not a likely explanation for the increased selling prior to takeover 
announcements. Consistent with studies by Zivney, Bertin & Torabzadeh (1996) and Gao and Oler (2004), significant returns 
were achieved by taking a short position on the day of the rumour announcement, suggesting a shorting strategy was actually 
profitable and a likely reason behind much of the selling in the primary sample. Furthermore, the finding that contraire trading is 
likely to be occurring to some extent strengthens the argument for semi-strong efficiency and highlights investor over-reaction.  
 
5.3  Option Market 
If possible, informed traders prefer to trade on the option market rather than the spot market (Back, 1993; Biais and Hillion, 
1994; Easley, O’Hara and Srinivas, 1998; Arnold et al, 2001). The majority of these studies outlined stealth as a primary reason 
for this preference. That is, informed traders are able to hide their illegal activity to a much greater extent on the option market 
amongst the plethora of different contracts available on a given stock. A further reason put forward behind the preference of 
informed traders for the option market was leverage. Black (1975) highlights that given informed traders are fairly certain of the 
information they hold eventuating, they are able to achieve much greater returns through the lower up front costs of option 
contracts. 
 
We find that cumulative abnormal returns and abnormal trading volumes on those target stocks that have options available on 
them are much lower than those target stocks without options available on their underlying stock. This suggests that if options 
are available, that informed traders are likely to migrate to the options market consistent with the findings of Easley, O’Hara and 
Srinivas (1998). However, the same migration effect was not observed in regard to the opposite sell side positions. The lag 
effect between significant abnormal trading volume and significant abnormal returns remained the same on those targets with 
options available and those without. While it was hypothesized that the leverage effect may also provide a reason for contraire 
traders to migrate to the option market, the evidence of this study does not suggest this is the case. 
 
5.4  Deal Size 
Previous studies by Banz (1981) and Fama and French (1992) highlighted the effect firm size can have on the returns of stocks 
finding that smaller stocks achieved above average returns, and larger stocks below average returns. Furthermore, Barry and 
Brown (1984) purported that larger stocks achieve a greater degree of efficiency and fairer pricing; this being because they 
received a higher degree of media and market scrutiny of their activities. Our study found that larger targets exhibited a much 
lower cumulative abnormal return and abnormal trading volume in the pre-announcement period than did smaller targets. 
However, in regard to the opposite sell side activity, it was found that the lag effect and thus suggested contraire trading to 
exploit informed trader ‘over-reaction’ was much more evident in larger targets than smaller targets. This result appears counter 
intuitive and we have no suggestions as to why this may be the case.  
 
 
  - 25 -Section 6: Conclusion 
This study used event study methodology to examine the impact of takeover announcements on the trading patterns of target 
firms. The findings of positive cumulative abnormal returns and positive abnormal trading volumes prior to takeover 
announcements are consistent with most of the research in the field (e.g. Mandelker, 1974; Keown and Pinkerton, 1981; 
Asquith, 1983; Dennis and McConnell, 1986; Franks and Harris, 1989; Gao and Oler, 2004; Singh & Agarwal, 2006). 
Furthermore, abnormal trading activity was also found to be evident on the option market through abnormal trading volumes in 
both call and put options. The combination of such findings highlights that information asymmetry is likely to be occurring in 
the pre-announcement period, in conjunction with exploitative informed trading.  
 
In addition, a lag effect was found in the pre-announcement period whereby significant abnormal trading volume preceded 
significant abnormal returns. This lag effect indicating that for a period of time increased selling was offsetting buying. To 
explore this lag, the suggested liquidity clustering hypothesis for the selling (or contraire trading) was examined. Such a 
hypothesis was found to be unlikely given significantly positive abnormal bid-ask spreads during the pre-announcement period, 
and a positive relationship established between abnormal volume and abnormal spreads. Alternatively, the profitability of sell 
side transactions on an unbiased sample of takeover rumours was examined as a justification for deliberate sell side arbitrage of 
informed trader ‘over-reaction’. This investigation found that taking a short position on the day of the rumoured takeover in the 
Wall Street Journal produced significant returns as, more often than not, the takeover did not eventuate within a 70 day period. 
Given this finding, deliberate arbitrage trading is a plausible explanation for at least some of the sell side activity.  
 
Finally, sensitivity analysis was undertaken in regard to the issues of option availability and firm size (deal size). In this regard 
Black (1975) and Biais and Hillion (1994) suggested that informed traders prefer to trade on the option market if possible. This 
migration effect was supported in the results of this study, with those target firms that have options available on their underlying 
stock showing lower cumulative abnormal returns and trading volumes than those that do not.  Interestingly, no such migration 
effect was evident in the contraire sell side activity, with the lag effect remaining constant regardless of option availability or 
not. In regard to firm size, Barry and Brown (1984) suggested that larger firms receive greater media and market scrutiny, 
leading to greater efficiency and fairer prices. This studies finding in regard to this proposition were polarised. On the one hand 
cumulative abnormal returns and abnormal trading volumes were much lower in larger target firms. This result suggesting larger 
firms experienced a lower degree of informed trading, and thus greater efficiency. However, the lag effect was far greater in 
larger firms than smaller firms. Such a contrasting finding in regard to target size and market efficiency cannot be reconciled 
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Table 4.2: Abnormal Return and Volume Comparison – Deal Size $500m Plus 
 
Panel A shows the AR and CAR as calculated by the market model. Panel B shows the discrete and logarithmic free floating share adjusted (FFS) abnormal 
trading volumes. Test statistics and respective significance are shown for all measures with * denoting significance at 10% level,  ** at 5% and *** at 1% levels. 


























t-score FFS Log 
Abnormal 
Volume 
-25  212  0.09%  0.76  1.68%  1.52    24.78%  4.24***  18.44%  4.02*** 
-24  212  0.43%  1.25  2.11%  1.67    18.12%  4.16***  13.52%  3.35*** 
-23  212  -0.01%  -0.72  2.10%  1.56    17.88%  3.87***  15.58%  3.75*** 
-22  212  -0.13%  -1.26  1.96%  1.38    10.33%  2.67***  6.58%  1.43 
-21  212  0.30%  1.98**  2.26%  1.63    11.11%  3.06***  6.05%  1.83* 
-20  212  0.21%  0.94  2.47%  1.74*    7.15%  2.15**  6.10%  1.69* 
-19  212  0.25%  1.12  2.72%  1.87*    16.51%  3.71***  10.99%  2.94*** 
-18  212  0.06%  0.63  2.79%  1.93*    19.20%  4.49***  13.24%  3.19*** 
-17  212  -0.09%  -0.60  2.70%  1.84*    8.28%  2.15**  9.59%  2.50** 
-16  212  0.16%  1.57  2.86%  2.02**    7.67%  1.59  7.81%  2.04** 
-15  212  0.10%  -0.81  2.96%  1.91*    9.27%  2.39**  8.51%  2.30** 
-14  212  0.03%  0.54  2.99%  1.96**    7.79%  2.45**  6.95%  1.98** 
-13  212  -0.02%  0.19  2.97%  1.97**    11.13%  2.52**  6.47%  1.45 
-12  212  0.34%  1.39  3.30%  2.12**    7.78%  1.72*  7.96%  1.68* 
-11  212  0.19%  1.04  3.49%  2.23**    41.46%  7.16***  14.40%  3.02*** 
-10  212  0.03%  -0.41  3.52%  2.17**    33.65%  7.74***  12.23%  3.10*** 
-9  212  0.10%  0.69  3.62%  2.23**    22.92%  5.03***  14.87%  3.77*** 
-8  212  0.15%  0.37  3.78%  2.26**    36.92%  6.98***  21.01%  5.03*** 
-7  212  0.15%  0.64  3.93%  2,32**    38.31%  8.64***  20.11%  5.13*** 
-6  212  0.03%  0.82  3.96%  2.40**    25.44%  5.80***  17.49%  4.25*** 
-5  212  0.15%  1.16  4.11%  2.52**    31.96%  6.81***  20.98%  5.33*** 
-4  212  0.11%  1.18  4.22%  2.64***    28.68%  6.66***  16.22%  4.50*** 
-3  212  0.16%  0.55  4.38%  2.68***    37.28%  7.97***  17.39%  4.65*** 
-2  212  0.53%  1.73*  4.91%  2.86***    56.11%  12.04***  28.40%  7.28*** 
-1  212  0.95%  6.37***  5.86%  3.56***    124.78%  25.75***  44.56%  11.72*** 
0  212  12.65%  79.75***  18.50%  12.45***    2230.31%  406.75***  295.14%  73.96*** 
1  212  1.49%  8.54***  19.99%  13.32***    783.45%  148.71***  203.95%  51.19*** 
  - 32 -Table 4.3: Abnormal Return and Volume Comparison – Deal Size $100m to $500m 
 
Panel A shows the AR and CAR as calculated by the market model. Panel B shows the discrete and logarithmic free floating share adjusted (FFS) abnormal 
trading volumes. Test statistics and respective significance are shown for all measures with * denoting significance at 10% level,  ** at 5% and *** at 1% levels. 


























t-score FFS Log 
Abnormal 
Volume 
-25  181  0.28%  0.66  2.44%  1.01    7.45%  1.19  6.01%  0.79 
-24  181  0.65%  5.76***  3.09%  1.77*    26.65%  1.39  5.78%  0.05 
-23  181  -0.43%  -1.83*  2.67%  1.51    51.26%  3.55***  17.23%  1.19 
-22  181  0.18%  -0.45  2.85%  1.44    3.76%  0.19  7.21%  0.25 
-21  181  0.03%  0.40  2.88%  1.48    5.24%  0.13  -4.97%  -1.11 
-20  181  0.10%  0.41  2.98%  1.52    -1.01%  -0.41  10.19%  0.74 
-19  181  -0.13%  -0.37  2.86%  1.46    2.20%  -0.12  3.53%  -0.11 
-18  181  0.47%  2.00**  3.33%  1.70*    -3.96%  -0.43  6.03%  -0.10 
-17  181  0.35%  0.96  3.68%  1.81*    -7.53%  -1.03  7.40%  0.01 
-16  181  0.15%  0.05  3.82%  1.80*    21.69%  1.47  6.95%  0.23 
-15  181  0.21%  0.53  4.03%  1.85*    -0.75%  -0.63  3.09%  -0.29 
-14  181  0.35%  1.02  4.38%  1.97**    32.81%  3.09***  19.74%  2.16** 
-13  181  0.08%  0.39  4.46%  2.00**    7.95%  0.69  8.63%  0.79 
-12  181  -0.01%  0.50  4.45%  2.04**    19.11%  1.50  15.81%  1.66* 
-11  181  -0.06%  -0.93  4.39%  1.92*    18.84%  1.12  20.54%  1.66* 
-10  181  0.30%  0.90  4.69%  2.01**    26.56%  2.00**  18.21%  1.42 
-9  181  0.10%  -0.87  4.78%  1.89*    25.41%  2.19**  21.18%  2.03** 
-8  181  -0.31%  -0.56  4.47%  1.81*    22.18%  2.26**  21.59%  2.09** 
-7  181  0.31%  1.08  4.78%  1.93*    21.25%  1.90*  23.10%  2.38** 
-6  181  0.37%  1.71*  5.15%  2.11**    28.00%  2.13**  14.83%  0.93 
-5  181  0.13%  0.89  5.28%  2.20**    82.51%  7.00***  14.66%  0.73 
-4  181  0.58%  2.59**  5.86%  2.49**    61.54%  7.72***  15.12%  1.60 
-3  181  0.54%  2.19**  6.40%  2.72***    42.21%  4.12***  17.39%  1.70* 
-2  181  0.59%  2.09**  6.99%  2.94***    92.00%  5.94***  28.71%  3.09*** 
-1  181  1.04%  3.70***  8.03%  3.34***    64.72%  8.25***  24.82%  3.10*** 
0  181  13.52%  56.25***  21.55%  9.60***    3451.28%  371.18***  346.86%  48.70*** 
1  181  1.86%  10.14***  23.40%  10.67***    1041.43%  109.72***  239.70%  32.99*** 
  - 33 -able 4.4: Abnormal Return and Volume Comparison – Options Available On Stock 
 
Panel A shows the AR and CAR as calculated by the market model. Panel B shows the discrete and logarithmic free floating share adjusted (FFS) abnormal 
trading volumes. Test statistics and respective significance are shown for all measures with * denoting significance at 10% level,  ** at 5% and *** at 1% levels. 


























t-score FFS Log 
Abnormal 
Volume 
-25  122  -0.18%  -0.20  0.81%  0.70    24.33%  3.39***  16.79%  3.40*** 
-24  122  0.53%  1.73*  1.34%  0.93    19.68%  3.45***  10.69%  2.40** 
-23  122  -0.23%  -1.78*  1.11%  0.68    18.12%  2.73***  12.31%  2.43** 
-22  122  -0.30%  -1.97**  0.81%  0.42    16.12%  2.27**  8.03%  1.34 
-21  122  0.39%  1.51  1.20%  0.61    14.62%  2.36**  7.70%  1.74* 
-20  122  0.18%  0.34  1.38%  0.65    7.65%  1.57  7.72%  1.56 
-19  122  0.17%  0.65  1.56%  0.73    18.07%  2.94***  12.48%  2.50** 
-18  122  -0.32%  -0.75  1.23%  0.63    16.14%  2.68***  8.93%  1.84* 
-17  122  -0.08%  -0.29  1.15%  0.59    12.88%  1.99**  14.16%  2.83** 
-16  122  0.09%  1.19  1.24%  0.73    13.44%  1.85*  11.30%  2.23** 
-15  122  0.10%  -0.85  1.34%  0.62    12.96%  2.15**  10.89%  2.19** 
-14  122  0.03%  1.03  1.37%  0.74    17.35%  2.89***  11.29%  2.37** 
-13  122  -0.15%  -0.86  1.22%  0.63    19.61%  2.07**  8.37%  1.22 
-12  122  -0.04%  0.09  1.18%  0.64    9.40%  1.62  7.50%  1.34 
-11  122  0.02%  0.02  1.20%  0.63    15.44%  2.12**  11.19%  1.90* 
-10  122  0.23%  1.07  1.43%  0.76    38.67%  7.18***  14.26%  2.65*** 
-9  122  0.40%  1.08  1.84%  0.88    32.21%  5.14***  17.13%  3.30*** 
-8  122  0.38%  0.38  2.21%  0.92    35.50%  5.26***  20.11%  3.69*** 
-7  122  0.33%  0.92  2.54%  1.02    54.15%  8.82***  23.26%  4.52*** 
-6  122  -0.03%  0.61  2.51%  1.08    28.08%  5.07***  15.65%  3.30*** 
-5  122  0.21%  0.71  2.72%  1.16    25.52%  4.00***  20.51%  4.09*** 
-4  122  0.30%  1.79*  3.02%  1.36    38.90%  5.84***  21.83%  4.35*** 
-3  122  0.02%  -0.33  3.04%  1.31    31.98%  5.26***  16.39%  3.28*** 
-2  122  0.67%  1.77*  3.72%  1.50    65.73%  10.59***  28.74%  5.99*** 
-1  122  1.18%  5.97***  4.89%  2.16**    179.67%  27.25***  55.30%  11.49*** 
0  122  11.60%  52.69***  16.50%  8.04***    1679.74%  247.32***  271.01%  55.90*** 
1  122  1.91%  9.57***  18.41%  9.05***    655.27%  105.90***  191.04%  39.58*** 
  - 34 -Table 4.5: Abnormal Return and Volume Comparison – Options Not Available 
   
Panel A shows the AR and CAR as calculated by the market model. Panel B shows the discrete and logarithmic free floating share adjusted (FFS) abnormal 
trading volumes. Test statistics and respective significance are shown for all measures with * denoting significance at 10% level,  ** at 5% and *** at 1% levels. 






























t-score FFS Log 
Abnormal 
Volume 
-25  271  0.33%  1.35  2.56%  1.70*    17.95%  3.46***  12.82%  2.70*** 
-24  271  0.53%  4.65***  3.09%  2.31**    23.12%  2.50**  9.62%  1.39 
-23  271  -0.18%  -0.94  2.90%  2.16**    40.06%  4.50***  18.15%  2.66*** 
-22  271  0.15%  -0.16  3.05%  2.12**    3.34%  0.99  6.35%  0.57 
-21  271  0.09%  1.06  3.14%  2.24**    5.61%  1.23  -2.06%  -0.46 
-20  271  0.14%  0.94  3.28%  2.34**    1.48%  0.52  8.10%  1.05 
-19  271  0.03%  0.25  3.31%  2.36**    6.25%  1.21  5.34%  0.83 
-18  271  0.51%  2.69***  3.83%  2.68***    5.11%  1.83*  10.36%  1.50 
-17  271  0.19%  0.45  4.02%  2.71***    -4.35%  -0.27  6.07%  0.32 
-16  271  0.17%  0.63  4.20%  2.77***    14.44%  1.44  5.66%  0.50 
-15  271  0.17%  0.29  4.37%  2.79***    0.91%  0.16  3.81%  0.33 
-14  271  0.25%  0.62  4.62%  2.84***    20.19%  2.76***  13.54%  1.93* 
-13  271  0.10%  1.06  4.72%  2.95***    5.18%  1.41  7.06%  1.12 
-12  271  0.27%  1.58  4.99%  3.12***    14.62%  1.66*  13.41%  1.94* 
-11  271  0.11%  0.15  5.10%  3.11***    38.06%  5.83***  19.95%  2.75*** 
-10  271  0.13%  0.35  5.23%  3.05***    26.65%  3.66***  15.31%  2.12** 
-9  271  -0.03%  -0.83  5.20%  2.93***    20.40%  2.79***  18.07%  2.78*** 
-8  271  -0.24%  -0.38  4.95%  2.87***    27.72%  4.48***  21.80%  3.68*** 
-7  271  0.18%  0.83  5.13%  2.94***    19.78%  3.28***  20.69%  3.45*** 
-6  271  0.29%  1.71*  5.42%  3.12***    25.96%  3.48***  16.55%  2.30** 
-5  271  0.12%  1.28  5.54%  3.25***    68.62%  9.06***  16.98%  2.57*** 
-4  271  0.33%  1.96**  5.87%  3.45***    46.03%  8.28***  12.96%  2.38** 
-3  271  0.48%  2.50***  6.35%  3.72***    42.96%  6.89***  17.84%  3.30*** 
-2  271  0.50%  2.05***  6.85%  3.92***    75.74%  8.40***  28.46%  4.95*** 
-1  271  0.91%  4.65***  7.76%  4.42***    59.96%  11.24***  26.54%  5.19*** 
0  271  13.69%  81.15***  21.45%  13.47***    3293.65%  497.16***  340.55%  67.71*** 
1  271  1.55%  9.42***  23.00%  14.43***    1013.46%  150.14***  233.64%  45.68*** 
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Table 4.6: Abnormal Spreads 
Abnormal spreads calculated with four different measures Dollar, Proportional, Effective and Proportional Effective spreads as prescribed in section 3.4.3. Test statistics and respective 
















-25  393  0.17  2.34**  0.53%  1.64*  0.09  4.63***  0.29% 
-24  393  0.18  4.55***  0.41%  3.87***  0.06  5.60***  -0.02% 
-23  393  0.15  4.57***  0.35%  3.46***  0.02  4.32***  -0.02% 
-22  393  0.15  5.25***  0.36%  4.03***  0.02  4.57***  -0.13% 
-21  393  0.20  3.89***  0.55%  2.80***  0.05  5.46***  0.09% 
-20  393  0.15  2.99***  0.24%  1.82*  0.06  2.47**  0.04% 
-19  393  0.20  4.77***  0.47%  3.43***  0.04  5.01***  -0.07% 
-18  393  0.19  3.52***  0.44%  2.30**  0.06  4.27***  0.02% 
-17  393  0.20  12.23***  0.82%  12.60***  0.03  4.34***  0.02% 
-16  393  0.11  2.43**  -0.03%  1.02  0.02  5.02***  -0.19% 
-15  393  0.17  4.77***  0.65%  3.06***  0.01  2.94***  -0.06% 
-14  393  0.12  3.11***  0.17%  2.33**  0.05  4.13***  -0.07% 
-13  393  0.08  2.57**  -0.08%  1.48  0.02  4.35***  -0.15% 
-12  393  0.09  3.17***  0.08%  1.75*  0.07  5.66***  0.18% 
-11  393  0.13  3.83***  0.10%  2.18**  0.03  4.54***  -0.09% 
-10  393  0.12  4.17***  0.12%  2.02**  0.03  3.77***  0.12% 
-9  393  0.10  3.80***  0.03%  1.74*  0.05  7.47***  0.04% 
-8  393  0.13  1.97**  0.09%  0.22  0.09  4.99***  0.01% 
-7  393  0.09  2.67***  -0.03%  1.36  0.02  3.68***  -0.17% 
-6  393  0.09  1.90*  0.11%  0.33  0.04  4.55***  -0.03% 
-5  393  0.33  2.24**  1.00%  0.98  0.19  3.37***  0.42% 
-4  393  0.34  4.29***  0.77%  2.02**  0.09  3.88***  -0.02% 
-3  393  0.34  4.35***  1.19%  1.77*  0.25  7.23***  0.42% 
-2  393  0.53  21.75***  1.94%  22.61***  0.33  29.78***  0.65% 
-1  393  0.40  6.88***  0.96%  3.97***  0.62  30.40***  1.73% 
0  393  0.15  3.19***  0.29%  2.72***  0.43  35.73***  1.88% 
1  393  -0.26  -4.04***  -0.43%  -6.25***  0.23  10.10***  0.30% 
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